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Blaming “Culture:” “Cultural” Evidence in Homicide
Prosecutions and a New Perspective on Blameworthiness1
BY: CHRISTIAN G. OHANIAN
I. INTRODUCTION

O

n October 20, 2009, twenty-year-old Noor Almaleki was allegedly run over in a parking lot in
Peoria, Arizona by her father, Faleh Almaleki.2
She died soon after in a hospital.3 According to reports, Noor’s father had grown upset that his daughter was “too
westernized” and that she “failed to live by traditional Muslim
values and had disrespected the family.”4
This story reflects the controversial issue facing American
courts as to when a defendant’s culture is relevant in defending
his or her homicide charge. Some have argued that there should
be a formal, independent cultural defense equivalent to that
of an insanity excuse.5 Many
have claimed that in order to
ensure all the circumstances
affecting a particular defendant are considered, a court
must consider a person’s culture as an influencing factor
in their commission of a homicide.6 Here, the focus is primarily on the policy theories
that support the admissibility
of evidence of culture through
the traditional defenses to homicides. The arguments discussed are those that support
broad admissibility as well as the relevant critiques of the various theories. The questions at the heart of this paper are: 1) who
is actually capable of introducing this cultural evidence under
the current conceptual framework; 2) who might be affected
negatively by a limited category of persons that are capable of
introducing evidence of culture; 3) what do these issues tell us
about how we have conceived of this defense?
At the outset of their assessments, scholars who support introducing culture evidence make a blameworthiness determination as to who can introduce this evidence and who is negatively
affected by that exclusive category. For various and entirely
defensible reasons, status as a recent immigrant, for example,
only a limited group of persons is capable of introducing rel-
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evant evidence as to the influence of his/her culture on his/her
commission of a homicide. We, as a society, have not determined who can introduce cultural evidence to negate a requisite
mental state in homicide prosecutions based on values such as
individualizing justice, equal protection, or multiculturalism.
Instead, society accepts cultural evidence based on its perception of the blameworthiness of a newly immigrated defendant
and his/her un-familiarity with American criminal law, as well
as, American cultural values in general.
If we do not permit every defendant to introduce evidence of his/her possibly relevant culture in the context of their
commission of a homicide, then we should admit that we, as
a society, are making decisions based purely on relativistic
blameworthiness. We are essentially deciding that there
are certain cultures that in
certain contexts can be admitted to “account” for the mental state of a defendant. If, in
the context of homicide law,
we, as a society are not fully
recognizing individualized
justice, equal protection, and
multiculturalism as to every
defendant and his/her culture,
then society can go further in
limiting when evidence of a
defendant’s culture can be introduced to account for his/her mental state. Such a limitation
prevents defendants from introducing cultural evidence, which
can demonstrate that defendants’ allegedly culturally motivated
actions did not have the principle purpose of “maliciously” intending to harm the victim.7 This new standard is later detailed
in this Article and applied to cases that have dealt with the admission of evidence of culture.
Part II advances the traditional methods used to introduce
cultural evidence in defense to homicide prosecutions in most
American jurisdictions. In Part III of this Article, there is a discussion of some cases that have involved the introduction of
cultural evidence. Part IV, introduces and critiques the policy
theories that support the admissibility of this evidence. Finally,
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Part V argues the approach to blameworthiness and the admissibility of cultural evidence.

II. DEFENSES USED TO INTRODUCE
“CULTURAL” EVIDENCE
It should be emphasized at the outset that the issue of cultural evidence and its place in homicide prosecutions that it is
one of an expansion of the current traditional homicide defenses.
The defenses discussed below are all available in their traditional form to every homicide defendant. This section outlines
some of the methods, both theoretical and practical, defendants
employ in defense to a homicide charge—by raising issues
of their culture. One method that has been suggested, though
never actually implemented in any jurisdiction, is a full formal
cultural defense.8 Some scholars support recognizing an independent cultural defense that would function as a full excuse.9
These scholars argue that a full defense would be beneficial by
allowing the justice system to evaluate more homicides that are
allegedly culturally motivated.10 Effectively, this defense would
function similarly to that of an insanity defense, as it would fully
justify the homicide.11 Although scholars frequently discuss a
full defense in academia, scholars recognize that it has never
been employed in an American jurisdiction.12 As this concept
of the full cultural defense has never been used with regard to
cultural influences in homicide prosecutions, it is not addressed
it in this Article. It seems to be the least likely of all possible
solutions to the issue of culture in homicide prosecutions.
Defendants introduce elements of culture at trial through
the existing defenses and excuses such as: insanity, diminished
capacity, provocation, and mistake of law or fact.13 Defendants
in different jurisdictions have attempted to introduce evidence
of their respective cultures to support these various defenses to
homicide prosecutions.14 Some jurisdictions have allowed defendants to use evidence of culture to support these defenses.15
However, other jurisdictions have refused to expand the boundaries of what evidence is traditionally admissible with respect to
these defenses.16 The following section discusses cases involving the introduction of cultural evidence with the use of various
defenses to homicide prosecutions.

III. CASES INVOLVING CULTURAL EVIDENCE
The issue of cultural evidence and its admissibility in homicide prosecutions has arisen in many different states across
the country.17 Many of these homicides involve the murder of
women and children in response to alleged claims of spousal
infidelity.18 However, cultural evidence has been a factor in a
variety of other homicides involving a myriad of alleged moti-

vations.19 In the following section, four homicides are discussed
that involved cultural evidence – two of which involved spousal
infidelity and two with different alleged motivations.
In People v. Kimura,20 cultural evidence of was introduced
to support a “temporary insanity” defense for a woman charged
with the murder of her two children.21 After discovering that
her husband was unfaithful she proceeded to attempt oyakoshinju,22 referred to as a traditional Japanese parent-child suicide ritual.23 She claimed she chose to kill herself so as not to
live in shame in this world and that to do so without also taking
her children into the “afterlife” would have been a sign of poor
motherhood.24 Eventually, her murder charge was reduced to
voluntary manslaughter through a plea bargain that was proposed following an outcry from the local Japanese community
and expert testimony regarding her culture and the shame that
may have induced mental instability.25
In People v. Chen,26 the defendant killed his wife after
learning of her infidelity.27 Chen “offered cultural evidence to
show that, as a person from ‘mainland China,’ his wife’s adultery so completely obliterated his sense of control that he was
provoked to kill his wife.”28 Chen was permitted to introduce
evidence of culture to support this claim of the relationship
between his lack of control and his status as a recent Chinese
immigrant.29 Chen received only a probationary sentence after
convincing the judge that “traditional Chinese values drove him
to kill his wife.”30
In State v. France,31 a Korean defendant accidentally killed
her child by leaving him alone in a motel room dresser drawer.32
She was subsequently convicted of second-degree murder.33
The judge ruled that evidence of her culture was inadmissible.34
However, if admitted it purported to demonstrate that in Korea,
it is common to leave children alone in the home as neighbors
and friends are considered unpaid “babysitters.”35 Eventually,
“France was released on parole following a massive campaign
organized by Korean women, who pointed out the lack of culturally specific information in her representation.”36
In the case of the death of Binh Gia Pham, five friends
of this Buddhist youth helped Pham douse himself in gasoline
and light him on fire in political protest, not aware that such
actions were crimes in America.37 They also videotaped the
self-immolation.38 They were all charged with second-degree
manslaughter,39 carrying a possible sentence of up to ten years
in prison.40 The practice of Buddhist persons engaging in selfimmolation in political protest is common in other parts of the
world.41 The judge sentenced the defendants with probation,
reasoning that Pham would have committed suicide “with or
without” assistance.42
The Chen and Kimura cases reflect the reality that many
homicides involving evidence of culture are allegedly provoked
by acts of spousal infidelity.43 Conversely, France and Pham
reflect alternate circumstances for the introduction of evidence

of culture.44 They appear to be cases involving issues of mistake
of fact or law regarding the defendants’ actions and their consequences under American law. There are likely to be different
perceptions of blameworthiness that society attaches to these
different types of homicides.
The Pham and France cases raise significant questions as
to how their respective cultures may have affected the principle
purpose of their actions. In the Pham case, the victim’s friends
assisted the youth in committing suicide in accordance with his
cultural traditions.45 Pham thereby engaged in an act of selfimmolation, which is a recognized form of protest in some parts
of the world.46
In the France case, the defendant left her child in the drawer
of a motel,47 arguably without the principle purpose to harm the
child but out of a culturally influenced conception of Korean
childcare.48 A jury may not believe that such evidence of culture
in these two cases indicates that the
principle purpose of the defendants’
actions lacked intent to harm. Yet, it
seems plausible that one could distinguish these cases with regard to
the nature of the defendant’s intent
from a case such as Chen.
In Chen, the defendant’s culture
was described as tangentially related
to his rage at discovering his wife’s
adultery.49 Despite his conviction for
second-degree murder, his actions
were principally guided by his intent
to murder his wife and his culture
was merely claimed to have exacerbated his emotional state.50 The
Kimura case, presents a more difficult example. In one sense, she certainly intended to cause harm to her
children as she did set out with the
principle purpose to kill them.51 Yet,
that purpose to kill was infused with concepts of “taking her
children into the afterlife” with her,52 which some may see as
not as blameworthy as the actions of the defendant in the Chen
case. However, the reality that there may be an issue as to what
a defendant’s culturally influenced purpose was with regard to
their intent to harm is what this Article seeks to address.

scholars are individualized justice, equal protection, and multiculturalism. With regard to the theory of individualized justice
supporting the introduction of evidence of culture, a seldom
considered, yet important, critique of this policy theory limits
what cultures can be said to “account” for the mental state of a
homicide defendant. Although culture is attached to the concept
of the push to admit this evidence, in reality, there are certain
circumstances where certain cultures are considered less blameworthy than others.

A. INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE
The necessity of individualizing justice as it pertains to
criminal defendants permeates American criminal jurisprudence. At the heart of this concept, is the idea that the circumstances, characteristics, history, culture, and a myriad of other
subjective elements that affect the mind and behavior of a defendant must be considered in order
to ensure a just determination of that
defendant’s culpability.53 According
to Professor Martin Gardner, “[i]
n the context of the criminal law,
the ultimate aim of this principle
of individualized justice is to tailor
punishment to fit the degree of the
defendant’s personal culpability.”54
This is a retributive theory; it argues
that it would be unjust to prohibit
the introduction of non-customary
evidence in criminal prosecutions.55
This theory of individualized justice
often finds its strongest supporters in
the realm of homicide prosecutions.56
The “Battered Spouse Defense”
is one of the more recent manifestations of this push to “individualize
justice” to a particular defendant’s
circumstances.57 Professor Doriane
Lambelet Coleman states, “[t]his movement [toward individualized justice] to inject subjectivity into the guilt phase of proceedings has been somewhat successful in cases where battered
women are tried for killing their abusers.”58 Effectively, this
defense has led some jurisdictions to relax the typical requirements with respect to provocation and self-defense.59
Although not as broadly successful, a similar push has
occurred to permit the introduction of evidence of culture to
support homicide defenses such as provocation, insanity, and
mistake of law or fact.60 Some scholars have suggested evidentiary approaches to cultural evidence that the “purpose of
the cultural practice” and “moral culpability” along with several other factors in determining the admissibility of such evidence.61 However, because these approaches are not grounded

Although culture is
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IV. RATIONALE AND CRITIQUE OF THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF CULTURAL EVIDENCE
As with all aspects of American homicide law, policybased theories support and justify the admissibility of evidence
of culture. The three prominent theories often recognized by
30
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in the premise that the underlying motivation for the admission
of this evidence is “blameworthiness,” they do not suggest that
“intent to harm” or “malice” should be the only considerations
evaluated in deciding whether to admit “cultural” evidence.62
Professor Alison Dundes Renteln stated, “[i]f the legal system
is to understand what motivates the actions of another, it must
understand that person’s culture.”63 Many scholars justify a request for leniency based upon the idea that the newly immigrated person is unfamiliar with American criminal law.64 An
article in the Harvard Law Review asserts,
Although ignorance of the law is generally no excuse
in a criminal prosecution fairness to the individual
defendant suggests that ignorance of the law ought to
be a defense for persons who were raised in a foreign
culture. Treating persons raised in a foreign culture
differently should not be viewed as an exercise in favoritism, but rather as a vindication of the principles
of fairness and equality that underlie a system of individualized justice.65
In addition to issues of mistake of law as to newly immigrated persons, group based standards have also been considered as a method to address the issue of individualizing justice
for a defendant seeking to introduce evidence of culture.66 Concepts such as the “reasonable Italian man” or the “reasonable
Mexican man” as standards have been largely unsuccessful
when presented at trial.67 However, the attempt to establish such
group-based standards is an important permutation of attempts
to individualize justice for defendants who wish to incorporate
their respective cultures into their defenses to homicide prosecutions. Although this move to individualize justice has its
advocates, it has also faced a significant amount of critique.68
There are many critiques that face the individualized justice
theory for supporting the admissibility of evidence of culture.
However, two seldom, and never thoroughly considered critiques are important: 1) What qualifies as a supposed “accountable culture” and 2) What elements of a supposed “accountable
culture” would need to manifest in order to be considered under
this theory? These considerations cut at the heart of this concern
for individualizing justice to a particular defendant.
An “accountable culture” for the purposes of this Article
is a culture that has a significant enough influence on the defendant’s mental state, decisions, and actions that resulted in
a crime (more specifically here, a homicide) that courts have
found, or are likely to find, that the culture accounts in a significant way for the defendant’s commission of a homicide. Some
might shy away from labeling a defendant’s culture as potentially accountable in some way for the commission of a crime
for the unfortunate connotations of such a label. However, as
this Article, merely attempts to accurately illustrate the reality of this complex issue. By allowing evidence of a person’s
Criminal Law Brief

culture to account for his/her mental state in the commission
of a homicide, courts in this country are permitting some defendants’ cultures to account in some significant way for his/
her commission of a homicide, while other defendants’ cultures
cannot.
Some scholars have touched on the difficulty in defining
what would constitute an accountable culture under the current conception of a cultural defense or admissible evidence of
culture. Daina C. Chiu stated, “[t]he defense also essentializes
culture by defining it as the exclusive province of particular
groups. Under affirmative defense proponents’ conception of
culture, some groups have culture, others do not.”69 This inherent exclusiveness as to whom can possess an accountable
culture in the context of homicide prosecutions creates a serious
flaw in the move to individualize justice. Chiu goes on to indicate the difficulty in defining culture as part of the problem, “[d]
efining the parameters of a group who could raise the defense
would require crafting a rule that would take into account the
innumerable permutations of race, ethnicity, language, education, religion, culture, gender, length of residence in the United
States, and age.”70 However, although a legal definition of cultures that could be held accountable under the law would be
difficult to determine, anthropologists have attempted to synthesize a definition of culture:
Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of
human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and
especially their attached values.71
This definition indicates that “patterned ways of thinking,
feeling and reacting” could apply to people raised in many different communities, both newly immigrated and otherwise.72
However, although the common conception of culture is something that can affect the behavior of essentially anyone raised in
a certain community, the concept of culture that most theorists
consider when discussing cultural defenses and cultural evidence is limited to those cultures of newly immigrated persons.
Professor Volpp stated, “the concept of a ‘cultural defense’ rests
on the idea of a community not fully ‘integrated’ into the United
States and assists . . . ‘immigrants.’”73 Another author noted
that culture encompasses a “vast” array of factors,74 but still
proceeded to limit the concept of a cultural defense as one pertaining to “immigrants, refugees, and indigenous people based
on their customs or customary law.”75 Although it is understandable to limit the concept of a cultural defense to those who are
newly immigrated and thus unaccustomed to the criminal law
of this country, limiting supposed accountable cultures to that of
newly immigrated persons chips away at the argument that evi31

dence of culture must be introduced in homicide prosecutions
in order to individualize justice. Individuals raised in American
communities with strict cultures who were equally affected by
culture would be prevented from introducing this evidence of
culture if they were not newly immigrated to this country.
In addition to the issues that surround a limited category
of supposed accountable cultures, even with such a category
we would still be faced with determining what elements of that
person’s culture would have a significant enough affect on their
behavior to warrant admissibility as evidence. As one author
states,
The cultural defense seeks to encompass a vast range
of factors that include social mores, beliefs, practices,
and values about gender, family, government, and religion, to name only a few. The challenge of creating
and mounting a cultural defense is to select from many
cultural factors those that are relevant and applicable.76
Although this author is referring to the concept of a full affirmative cultural defense,77 this issue—what elements of a person’s
culture would be relevant and admissible for exculpatory purposes in a homicide proceeding—also applies to evidence of
culture. Professor Kim describes the practical issue of expert
testimony and how it has the potential to paint a skewed image
of one’s culture:
Given the difficult in defining culture, the likelihood
increases that expert testimony will, out of necessity,
provide a broad, simplistic characterization of the defendant’s culture rather than accurate, contemporary
depiction of the norms and mores that reflect the social
progress occurring in the defendant’s home country.78
The issues of determining what cultures would be considered accountable and the related issue of what elements of such an accountable culture would be relevant, to demonstrate the inherent
difficulties with individualizing justice as to culture. According
to most theorists, certain persons, whose behavior would likely
be affected or dictated by their respective cultures, would be
incapable of using such evidence if they were not newly immigrated.79 Furthermore, even if they were newly immigrated
and could admit evidence under this theory, there would still be
discretionary choices as to what elements of their culture were
responsible for their actions.80 If we are truly concerned about
individualizing justice based on a person’s culture, then we need
to expand this concept to include all cultures that could influence a defendant’s behavior. However, since we do not take
such a broad approach to supposed accountable cultures, the
current limitations on admissible evidence significantly undermines the argument that we are individualizing justice for each
defendant.
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B. EQUAL PROTECTION
Another policy concern is whether immigrants are receiving equal protection of the law when they cannot introduce
evidence of culture in homicide prosecutions.81 The argument
focuses on a newly immigrated person being deprived of the
ability to fully litigate one of the established defenses such as:
insanity, self-defense, or provocation. By being prevented from
introducing all the evidence that would be relevant to their defenses, defendants are not able to fully litigate these defenses.
This causes newly immigrated persons to receive unequal treatment in comparison with other homicide defendants.
Many scholars discuss the issue of not being able to equally
litigate a defense to a homicide prosecution as it pertains to
the example of provocation. Professor James J. Sing stated, “[i]
f, however, the provocation defense is in essence a dominantcultural defense, then denying foreign defendants the right to
introduce cultural evidence effectively denies them use of the
provocation doctrine.”82 Professor Sing employs an example to
demonstrate this inequality: in cases where the prosecution must
prove malice, and the defendant is prevented from introducing
evidence of culture as provocation, the prosecution does not
have the same burden of proof as it would face with a noncultural defendant.83 Although, this is a valid concern regarding
which evidence can be introduced in support of one’s defense
to a homicide prosecution, some scholars have suggested it may
not be accurate to call this restriction a deprivation of equal protection of the law.84 Some scholars have argued that these homicide defendants are being restricted from admitting evidence
of culture to support a homicide defense in the same manner as
every other homicide defendant.85 This critique is particularly
convincing in light of the reality that very few defendants, those
who could legitimately claim some kind of cultural influence
with regard to their commission of a homicide, would be permitted to admit evidence of their culture.
Other scholars have argued that an alternate equal protection concern should take precedence: the equal protection of the
victims of allegedly “culturally motivated homicides.”86 Professor Coleman stated, “permitting the use of culture-conscious,
discriminatory evidence as part of the defendant’s case-in-chief
distorts the substantive criminal law and affords little or no protection to victims, whose assailants are left, as a result of this
distortion, relatively free from broader societal strictures.” 87
Many of these homicides are in response to alleged or actual
issues of spousal infidelity. With the prevalence of homicide
victims who are women and children, some are concerned that
by allowing certain defendants to use supposed accountable
cultures in their defense, the system will allow particular defendants to be exculpated where others would not, leaving these
victims with no legal recourse.88
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We, as a society, can take two approaches: 1) allow all persons,
influenced by any definable, recognizable culture to admit relevant
evidence in their homicide defense; or 2) limit the introduction of
evidence of culture to defendants who are likely to be considered by
society to be the least harmful or blameworthy.
Although the equal protection concern for defendants with
regard to evidence of culture is legitimate, the arguments regarding the equal protection of the victims of these homicides
would seem to be just as pressing.

C. MULTICULTURALISM
Multiculturalism, or “cultural pluralism,” is often used to
support the admissibility of evidence of culture in homicide
prosecutions. The theory of multiculturalism rests on the philosophical concept that objective truth in the law only exists as
reflected in the voices of those who draft the law.89 Furthermore,
this theory advocates that in order to build a truly just society
the law should reflect diverse voices, cultures and perceptions
in order to avoid ethnocentrism and to promote a deep respect
for all cultures.90
Some, if not all, of these scholars also advocate the
view that legal discourse and practice should be
changed to more accurately reflect the diverse voices
of all members of society. Indeed, it is argued that
without such a transformation, the fairness and justice
promised by a modern, liberal interpretation of our nation’s founding documents cannot be achieved.91
In addition, many proponents of multiculturalism in the
American legal system see the concept of assimilation as discriminatory.92 For example, Professor Sing believes, “the multiculturalism movement, whose proponents argue that the old
‘melting pot’ social metaphor, which privileges the erosion of
cultural distinctness in the dominant cultural stew, is obsolete
and at times discriminatory.”93 Although the diverse voices of
American society should be reflected in the drafting of our law,
it might be unreasonable to expect that such a value should be
capable of pushing the limits of homicide defenses. Some authors have gone as far as to say that evidence of culture should
be admissible in all prosecutions except for homicides because
of the severity of the crime.94 Again, although there is certainly
a value in reflecting multiculturalism in the law, it may not be
prudent to allow such a value to push the traditional boundCriminal Law Brief

aries of defenses to homicides. The policies of individualized
justice and equal protection are stronger than multiculturalism
in supporting the broad introduction of evidence of culture in
homicide prosecutions.
The aforementioned theories—individualized justice, equal
protection, and multiculturalism—are formidable policy justifications for the expansion of the traditional defenses to homicides in favor of evidence of culture. However, this Article
attempted to demonstrate that each of these policy justifications
have certain limitations based on their assumption that society perceives the newly immigrated defendant, rather than the
cultural defendant as less blameworthy when he/she commits
a homicide related to the alleged influence of his/her culture.
The justifications for expanding limits to traditional defenses
to allow for cultural evidence are inherently based on that preliminary blameworthiness determination, limiting who can avail
themselves of this evidence. We, as a society, can take two approaches: 1) allow all persons, influenced by any definable, recognizable culture to admit relevant evidence in their homicide
defense; or 2) limit the introduction of evidence of culture to
defendants who are likely to be considered by society to be the
least harmful or blameworthy. As it is virtually impossible that
any jurisdiction would recognize a broad concept of culture extending to anyone who could claim a definable culture, I will
focus on the second option.
In the next section, it is argued that although blameworthiness is a valid concern, if it is to be the basis for justifying the
admissibility of evidence of culture, then as a society we are
free to limit admissibility to those homicide defendants that we
perceive as the least blameworthy.

V. A NEW APPROACH TO CULTURAL EVIDENCE
AND BLAMEWORTHY HOMICIDES
Some scholars that discuss the admission of evidence of
culture believe that precisely because a homicide is a human
rights violation, evidence of culture should be permitted in
33

nearly every other criminal prosecution except homicide.95 The
aforementioned policy theories: individualized justice, equal
protection, and multiculturalism are valid theories concerned
with retributive and culpability issues surrounding homicide defendants. Although these concerns, and in particular the concern
for individualizing justice are valid, the previously discussed
limitations indicate that these theories are making blameworthiness determinations pertaining to a limited category of defendants at the outset.
The limited nature of these theories, as pertaining exclusively to the cultures of newly immigrated peoples, indicates
that these theories have made a blameworthiness determination based more on the recent immigration of the defendant,
rather than the cultural influence in question. There is certainly
validity in finding a newly immigrated defendant, unfamiliar
with American criminal law, to be less blameworthy for what
is allegedly culturally motivated action. However, we, as a society, could take a slightly different approach to this issue of
culpability.
In their debate over expanding the traditional limitations of
the insanity, provocation, and mistake of law or fact defenses
with regard to evidence of culture, scholars fail to address the
issue of whether the actor’s principle purpose was to cause
harm through his or her allegedly culturally motivated action.
Legitimate concerns regarding individualized justice, equal
protection, and multiculturalism should open the door to some
evidence of culture in some homicide prosecutions. However,
due to the previously discussed limitations, traditional defenses
should be expanded to admit this evidence only as far as what
society would consider the least blameworthy.
I would also limit my proposed approach regarding admissibility of cultural evidence to newly immigrated defendants or
those who have lived in extremely insular immigrant communities. This is a necessity, considering the unlikelihood of broader
acceptance for the admissibility of cultural evidence for other
defendants. However, the focus of this approach will not determine exactly how long an immigrant defendant would have to
be in this country or how insular his/her community must be.
Instead, my new approach is focused on creating a functional
framework for the actual admission of the evidence.
Society could agree that homicides which were caused by
allegedly culturally motivated actions whose principal purpose
was not intended to cause harm to the victims may constitute
a less blameworthy category of homicides. In such contexts,
judges should be permitted to admit cultural evidence. Furthermore, when this primary or principle purpose of intending harm functions as the central issue a judge would consider
when determining whether to admit cultural evidence is based
on a conception of intending harm closely paralleling “malice.”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines malice as: “1. The intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. 2. Reck34

less disregard of the law or of a person’s legal rights. 3. Ill will;
wickedness of heart.”96 This concept of malice, when a person
intends harm with “ill will” or a “wickedness of heart” certainly
could lead to issues of imprecision.
However, this is a workable concept of “intent to harm”
for my framework of introducing cultural evidence. If a person
commits a culturally motivated homicide, with intent to cause
harm that reflects malice, rather than some other culturally influenced purpose, then they will not be permitted to introduce
evidence of culture. To illustrate how my new approach to the
blameworthiness of allegedly culturally motivated homicides
would operate in actual scenarios, a new approach will be applied to the four cases described earlier: Chen, France, Pham,
and Kimura.
In Chen, the defendant “offered cultural evidence to show
that, as a person from ‘mainland China,’ his wife’s adultery so
completely obliterated his sense of control that he was provoked
to kill his wife.”97 Using expert testimony, Chen was permitted to introduce evidence as to the nature of his culture that
provoked him to kill his wife.98 Under my proposed approach
Chen would be prohibited from introducing the aforementioned
evidence as to his provocation. Even under the “influence of
his culture,” it is clear that Chen could not have perceived of
his actions as not maliciously intending to cause harm to his
wife. Therefore, under my approach to blameworthiness and
the admissibility of evidence of culture, Chen would only be
capable to admitting evidence traditionally permitted under the
provocation defense to homicide. He would not be allowed to
introduce cultural evidence.
Conversely, in the France case, where the defendant left her
child in a dresser drawer of a hotel room,99 the defendant would
be permitted to introduce evidence of culture. The relevant evidence of Korean culture seemed to indicate that neighbors often
served as unpaid “babysitters,” and the defendant claimed that
she did not intend to cause any harm to her child.100 As there is
an issue here of the defendant having a legitimate claim to not
maliciously intending to cause any harm, she would be permitted to introduce evidence of culture to support her defense.
Similarly, in the case of the friends of Binh Gia Pham,
this culture evidence would also be admissible. Pham’s friends
helped perform his political protest by assisting in his selfimmolation, and were later charged with second-degree manslaughter, facing up to ten years in prison.101 These youths had
no intention to harm their friend; they merely assisted him in his
decision to end his life in what is an accepted form of political
protest in some parts of the world.102 They would be permitted
to admit evidence of culture under my approach to support their
respective mistake of law of fact defense.
My proposed approach may function as an acceptable,
workable solution to manage the competing interests of the
aforementioned culpability theories that advocate for wideFall 2011

spread introduction of cultural evidence and for those who
believe it should not be admitted to expand the homicide defenses at all. However, like many blameworthiness approaches
in the criminal law, I recognize that it does have the potential
for rather controversial results. Take for example, the potential results in the aforementioned Kimura case, which involved
a woman who drowned her children and attempted to drown
herself in response to her husband’s infidelity.103 The theory
that the defense attempted to use was that she was driven insane due to her culture’s emphasis on how she was “living in
shame.”104 In addition, cultural evidence demonstrated that failing to “take” her children into the “afterlife” with Kimura would
have been a sign of “bad motherhood.”105 It could be argued
that Kimura should be entitled to introduce evidence of culture
due to the fact that in a metaphysical sense she could argue that
she was not maliciously attempting to “harm” her children by
taking them into the “afterlife.” Under my approach, there is
potential for cases such as this where determining “malice” and
“intent to harm” is difficult. However, a judge, functioning as
the gatekeeper of this evidence, and the jury with the power to
the credibility of such evidence, may be enough to manage the
difficulties.
Although the Kimura case illustrates how my approach
could create difficult determinations as to when to admit evidence of culture, there may be a workable solution. If we can
admit that the concept of expanding the established homicide
defenses to include evidence of culture is based on our society’s
perception of blameworthiness, then we are free to limit admissibility to defendants that society would likely consider the least
blameworthy. Limiting admissibility based on whether, while
influenced by his/her culture, the defendant’s actions reflected a
malicious purpose to harm the victim, may be a workable solution to the issue of the admissibility of cultural evidence.

tification for limiting this concept of cultural evidence to those
who are unfamiliar or unaccustomed to American criminal law
due to their minimal exposure to it in this country, that limitation does reflect a blameworthiness determination at the outset.
We, as a society, are unlikely to expand the concept of culture as it is considered with regard to cultural evidence, to apply
to all persons who may have a legitimate and influential culture
as a presence in their lives. Thus, if we can admit that we are
creating that limitation as a society at the outset of considering
cultural evidence for certain defendants, and not for others, then
we are free to place further limitations on when this evidence
can be considered. If we, as a society, consider certain actors to
be less blameworthy when they, while allegedly influenced by
their cultures, commit what the law may deem to be a homicide
without the primary purpose to maliciously cause harm to the
victim, then we should adopt an approach to match that reality.
There are drawbacks to my approach; one would be the occasional case where malice and intent to harm will be difficult to
determine. Nevertheless, if society can admit, for example, that
it is likely to perceive homicides that are motivated solely by
spousal infidelity as more blameworthy than other homicides,
such as the Buddhist self-immolation protest case, then we
should be able to craft a rule to reflect that reality.
If we do not wish to expand the traditional homicide defenses through a blameworthiness determination of the influence of a person’s culture, then we should cease the practice all
together. If we are to make certain blameworthiness determinations, then we should admit that we are pursuing that course and
employ a method that individualizes justice to a particular defendant while not undermining whatever concept of blameworthiness this society perceives with regard to certain homicides.

1

VI. CONCLUSION
The presence of many diverse cultures enriches each member of this society by expanding their perception of the world.
However, there are unfortunate moments when a person’s culture can be associated either willingly or unwillingly with the
commission of a homicide. The admissibility of evidence of culture to support defenses to homicides will not cease to be a difficult and controversial issue facing American courts throughout
the United States. Culture itself is a term that is difficult to
define, and in many cases, could apply to a wide spectrum of
persons whether or not they are newly immigrated to this country. Proponents of the expansion of the traditional defenses to
homicides to include evidence of culture do not generally suggest that this concept should apply to persons who are not newly
immigrated to this country.106 Although there is certainly a jusCriminal Law Brief
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